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Holmes v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 59 (Aug. 22, 2013)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW & EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined whether the fairness of a criminal trial was compromised 
by the district court’s admission into evidence of: (1) rap lyrics that the accused wrote 
while in jail; (2) a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statement that the accused “went off” and 
“just started shooting”; and (3) unwarned statements that the accused made to Nevada 
detectives who interviewed him out of state. 
 
Disposition 
 
 The Court affirmed the ruling of the district court. First, if accompanied by an 
appropriate limiting instruction, rap lyrics that describe details that closely mirror a crime 
charged, like other defendant-authored writings, are relevant and may be admissible as 
long as their probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Second, 
if the record does not establish that an objection was adequately preserved, the Court 
must speculate to whether an error or abuse of discretion occurred and is limited to “plain 
error” review. When the district court does commit a plain error, the Court will not find 
an abuse of discretion. Third, non-custodial interrogations do not require a warning.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Holmes plotted to steal drugs and money from Nelson and asked Richardson to 
call the victim and lure him to a location.  When Nelson and his friend, Clark, arrived at 
the location, Holmes and his co-conspirator, Reed, accosted Nelson and Clark.  After one 
of the two men shot Nelson, Clark managed to flee and call 911.  The police could not 
initially identify the two men, but they did recover a DNA sample near the scene.  Three 
years later, this DNA sample matched a sample Holmes gave California parole 
authorities.  Nevada detectives traveled to California to interview Holmes, who denied 
involvement. The detectives arrested Holmes and charged him with murder and robbery.  
At trial, the district court admitted three statements into evidence: (1) rap lyrics 
that Holmes wrote while in California, (2) an out-of-court statement made by Reed to 
Richardson that Holmes “went off” and “just started shooting,” and (3) unwarned 
statements made by Holmes to the Nevada detectives in California.  Holmes was 
subsequently found guilty of robbery and first-degree murder, both with the use of a 
deadly weapon.  Holmes appealed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  By Brian Vasek. 
2  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.015 (2011). 
3  See  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.025(1) (2011). 
Discussion 
 
A. Holmes’s Rap Lyrics  
 
Holmes’ first claim of evidentiary error focuses on the admission of the rap lyrics.  
The district court had determined that the lyrics were both relevant2 and presumptively 
admissible3 because they tended to prove Holmes’ involvement in the charged robbery 
and the “probative value” of the lyrics was not “substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice.”4 The court had also provided a limiting instruction that jurors could 
“consider if the above lyrics are confessions, admissions, o[r] neither,” and that they 
could not use the lyrics as evidence of bad character or criminal propensity.  
 The Supreme Court determined that the rap lyrics described details that mirrored 
the crime charged. After comparing the facts to similar cases in other jurisdictions,5 the 
Court held that while defendant-authored fictional accounts offered to show propensity 
for violence would likely be excluded, when the defendant-authored writings incorporate 
details of the crime charged, the accounts may be admissible.  Therefore, it was not 
unreasonable for the district court to admit the rap lyrics. The lyrics were relevant 
because so long as evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of the fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be 
would the evidence,” it is “relevant.”6  Here, the similarities between the lyrics and the 
facts of the charged robbery met the threshold test of relevance. 
 Furthermore, even if the lyrics were prejudicial, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the risk they carried of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh their probative value.  Only a single stanza of the lyrics was 
admitted against Holmes, and the district court crafted and gave an appropriate limiting 
instruction.  So, if the jurors followed the instructions, as the Court presumes they did,7 
the jurors only considered the lyrics if they found them autobiographical and they would 
not have allowed their feelings about rap music to influence their verdict. 
 
B. Reed’s Out-of-Court Statement to Richardson 
 
 Holmes’ second claim of evidentiary error focuses on Richardson’s testimony that 
Reed told Richardson after the crime that Holmes “went off” and “just started shooting.”  
Holmes argued that this did not qualify as a non-hearsay statement by a coconspirator 
because Reed did not make the statement to Richardson “during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”8  The Court rejected this claim for two reasons. 
 First, the record does not establish that the error was adequately preserved.  The 
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2  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.015 (2011). 
3  See  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.025(1) (2011). 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035(1) (2011).	  
5  Daniels v. Lewis, No. C 10-04032 JSW, 2013 WL 183968 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013); United States v. 
Stuckey, 253 F. App’x 468 (6th Cir. 2007). 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.015 (2011). 
7  Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 540, 558, 937 P.2d 473, 484 (1997). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(3)(e) (2011). 
grounds for objection. Thus, the Court lacked a satisfactory basis for assessing prejudicial 
error and its review was limited to “plain error.”9 
Second, the record does not establish an abuse of discretion by the district court.  
Under NRS 51.035(3)(e), “the duration of a conspiracy is not limited to the commission 
of the principal crime, but extends to affirmative acts of concealment.”  Richardson’s 
conversation with Reed occurred less than two hours after the murder and robbery.  With 
no record discussion of the “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” 
requirements of NRS 51.035(3)(e), it is not possible to say whether the conversation was 
to “keep conspirators abreast of ongoing activities [or] avoid detection” (admissible) or 
“mere conversations or narrative declarations of past events” (inadmissible).  Assuming 
objection, argument, perhaps an offer of proof, a ruling could legitimately have gone 
either way.  Accordingly, the Court did not find an abuse of discretion amounting to plain 
error. 
 
III. Holmes’s Statement to Nevada Detective in California 
 
 Lastly, Holmes argued that the district court should have suppressed the unwarned 
statement he made to the Nevada detectives who interviewed him in California. However, 
the interrogation was not custodial, and thus did not require a warning. 
 
Dissent 
 
 Justice Saitta believed that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 
lyrics.  The lyrics were not sufficiently probative as the crimes depicted in the lyrics were 
dissimilar from the crime charged.  The lyrics did not reflect knowledge of the specific 
event any more than they describe routine criminal behavior.  Moreover, the scant 
probative value of the lyrics was far outweighed by the danger of the unfair prejudice that 
they presented. Admitting the lyrics was an error, and the error was not harmless. The 
conviction should have been reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the rap lyrics, the 
statement of the co-conspirator, or the unwarned statement. 	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